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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to rising life expectancy and declining fertility, the world’s population is
ageing rapidly. Not only does the number of elderly relative to the number of
working-age people increase, so does the proportion of the very old in the
general population of the aged. In consequence, government spending on
pensions, health care and other services provided for the aged is increasing and
has been projected to rise on an even larger scale after the turn of the century.
How can the old-age social expenditures be accommodated into a sustainable
path for the general government budget?
2
In most European countries, public outlays allocated to the elderly are
financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, i.e. benefits paid to retired people
are directly financed by contemporaneous taxes levied on workers. In periods
with dramatic swings in the age structure, the tax rate is likely to swing as well.
For example, when the population is ageing, the ratio of the number of persons
of drawing age to that of those of contributing age increases, and PAYG
financing implies an increase in the transfers from young to old. Does that cause
generational conflicts, and will the PAYG scheme eventually be undermined?
                                                                                                                                   
1 Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), Copenhagen Business School.
Financial support from the Danish National Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Henrik Jacobsen
provided excellent research assistance.
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Bös (1992) and World Bank (1994).Fiscal Studies
2
The ageing phenomenon is not the only source of budgetary strain, however.
Many governments also feel a pressure from high levels of real interest rates
(and public debt) and large structural budget deficits. At the same time, a higher
weight has been attached to debt reduction. In Europe, for example, countries
aiming at EMU are required to bring their public-debt-to-GDP ratio below 60 per
cent, and public deficits should be below 3 per cent of GDP. Since nearly all EU
members (and potential entrants) currently fail to comply with these convergence
criteria, tighter fiscal policies are to be expected. What is the magnitude of the
fiscal adjustments to be undertaken as a result of the perceived need for debt
reduction?
In this paper, we consider alternative financing strategies in response to
changing demographics. Our study is relevant for a country with substantial
public debt and thus for most European countries. If a pressure on old-age public
expenditures cannot be financed through further debt issues, either a higher tax
rate or cuts in expenditures outside the old-age budget must be implemented. The
focus in the paper is very much on the timing of this contractionary fiscal
process.
3 In particular, instead of phasing in the increasing social expenditures
gradually, as implied by PAYG financing, one could ask whether governments
should begin to save in anticipation of future demographic burdens.
If such a forward-looking fiscal policy is embarked upon, an indebted
government would begin to bring down its debt-to-GDP ratio, hence easing the
tax burden on future generations. A far-sighted strategy would further enable the
government to maintain tax rates rather constant over the years. Indeed, since the
dead-weight loss imposed by a distortionary tax is known to increase by more
than in proportion to the tax rate, tax smoothing can be motivated on efficiency
grounds, cf. Barro (1979). Moreover, such a policy can be defended on
intergenerational distribution grounds. Overall, the prospects of population
ageing seem to provide a case for designing fiscal policy within a medium- to
long-term financial strategy.
We address this theme with Denmark as a case-study. However, as indicated
by Table 1, the magnitude and to some extent also the timing of the demographic
transition are similar across most OECD countries. Furthermore, public sector
involvement in securing pensions and services for the old is pronounced in all
industrialised countries. Hence, the methodology and results should be of more
general relevance (see also Johnson (1993)). In Section II, we try to identify the
nature of the demographic transition and its implications for old-age
expenditures. Section III sets out an intertemporal framework for designing fiscal
policy, and Section IV investigates the fiscal adjustments needed if the future tax
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TABLE 1
Percentage of Population over 60 Years Old
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Denmark 20.2 20.4 24.8 28.4 32.1
Germany 20.3 23.7 26.5 30.3 35.3
Japan 17.3 22.7 29.0 31.4 33.0
UK 20.8 20.7 23.0 25.5 29.6
US 16.6 16.5 19.2 24.5 28.2
OECD weighted average 18.2 19.9 23.1 27.0 30.7
Source: World Bank, 1994.
burden were to be smoothed. In Section V, we discuss how to evaluate the
desirability of alternative strategies. Finally, Section VI brings out some
conclusions.
II. PAY-AS-YOU-GO TAX PROFILES
In this section, we treat government outlays to the elderly as if they constitute a
separate government budget. Under a pay-as-you-go financing scheme, the per-
period budget constraint is Ne(ge+he) = Nlyl!l, where the left-hand side comprises
current government spending on the elderly and the right-hand side contains the
associated taxes levied on workers. Ne, ge and he denote, respectively, the number
of elderly, real per capita spending on services and real per capita income
transfers (pensions etc.) to the elderly. Nl is the number of working-age people, yl
is their real average before-tax income and !l is the old-age social security tax
rate (defined by the equation). The last is assumed to adjust endogenously in
response to changing demographics. In order to make assessments of !l in the
future, we need population projections and assumptions about the future course
of ge, he and yl.
As to the demographics, following standard age demarcations we define the
working-age population as those between the ages of 20 and 64, the elderly
population as those aged 65 and above,
4 and the very old, Nv, as those aged 80
and above. The projection period is 1994–2030. It is most interesting to look at
the ratio of elderly to working-age people, Ne/Nl, and the ratio of very old to the
general population of elderly, Nv/Ne; see Figure 1. While the former curve
provides information about the general ageing process, the latter tells which of
either the young or the old group of elderly is growing most rapidly. If both
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Source: Danmarks Statistik, 1993.
ratios are rising at the same time, we have the phenomenon often referred to as
‘double ageing’.
The first remarkable observation is that Ne/Nl displays a ‘j-curve’: over the
next 10 years or so, Ne/Nl is falling, whereupon it increases rather dramatically.
By international comparison, the prospect of a demographic ‘breathing-space’ is
rather unique (although a similar phenomenon appears to characterise the UK).
Second, there seems to be a tendency for Ne/Nl and Nv/Ne to move in different
directions, at least over the next 25 years: during the ‘breathing-space’, the share
of very old is rising, and when general ageing sets in, the share of very old is
falling. From about 2020, however, there will be some double ageing in
Denmark.
From an economic perspective, the apparent absence of double ageing until
2020 may be quite important. As indicated by Table 2 (which lists the base-year
levels of he and ge for different ages),
5 there is a strong positive relationship
between age of the elderly and public outlays on old-age services.
6 The point is,
of course, that very old people’s need for medical care, home care etc. is
substantially higher than young elderly’s need for those services. For that reason,
changes in the age structure within the group of elderly should be taken into
account when assessing the budgetary implications of ageing. For example,
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Per Capita Old-Age Expenditures
Age he ge he+ge
65 74.3 14.7 89.0
70 78.9 27.0 105.9
75 80.2 40.3 120.5
80 79.6 67.7 147.3
85 78.1 108.5 186.6
90 76.3 157.0 233.3
95 60.0 222.1 282.1
99+ 66.6 222.1 288.7
Source: Socialkommissionen, 1993.
while the ‘breathing-space’ (as identified by the simple ratios of elderly to
working-age people) points to a fall in social expenditures, the increasing share
of very old (and expensive) people tends to moderate this effect. Similarly, when
general ageing takes off from about 2005, the share of very old falls, hence
moderating the costs of ageing.
As to the average income of working-age people, we simply take GDP
divided by the number of working-age persons, i.e. yl = GDP/Nl.
7 The future path
of yl thus depends on both demographic factors and the growth rate of labour
productivity (q). For simplicity, we regard q as constant, and the average labour
income in the future is therefore given by yl,t = yl,0(1+q)
t.
The future paths of he and ge are determined by the underlying indexation
rules. We first consider a pure price indexation scheme (denoted by p), implying
that all future levels of per capita services and transfers are maintained at their
base-year level. This scheme implicitly assumes that gains from productivity
growth entirely accrue to members of the work-force. For example, if
productivity grows by 2 per cent a year, the growth rate of total benefits to the
elderly will be 2 percentage points less than that of the before-tax income of
wage-earners.
It would probably be more realistic to assume that productivity gains are
shared between workers and pensioners. For that reason, we examine an
alternative scheme, where both cash transfers and other costs go up in line with
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earnings (henceforth referred to as wage indexation, w).
8 Although this may be a
realistic scheme in the light of past experience, it may be more difficult to
employ in the future given the demographic projections as outlined above.
9
Indeed, since changes in the future PAYG tax rate are totally determined by
changes in the ratio of elderly to working-age people, wage indexation most
likely involves a considerable increase in the tax burden of working-age people.
While price indexation is unlikely to be acceptable to the old, wage
indexation is probably unacceptable to the young. Also, wage indexation could
distort labour markets to an extent which should not be neglected. With the aim
of reconciling the potential conflict between generational equity and economic
efficiency, we examine a ‘compromise’ scheme characterised by wage
indexation of transfers, while other costs are indexed at a rate one percentage
point lower than the growth rate of wages. Under this combined scheme (denoted
by c), productivity growth does to some extent mitigate the financial problems
arising from population ageing.
Furthermore, there is an important caveat regarding price indexation of old-
age services. In fact, given that the main costs of looking after the elderly are
wage costs (and medical costs), it seems rather unlikely that these costs could be
kept in line with prices. At the very least, rising wage costs would have to be
compensated by productivity increases in the provision of services.
Alternatively, the quality of services — and hence the living standard of the
elderly — would fall.
Let us now see how sensitive the future tax burden is to alternative
productivity growth rates and alternative indexation schemes; see Table 3. The
base-year level of !l is 11.0 per cent. We find that no matter the indexation
scheme and productivity growth rate, the tax burden will fall up to 2005. Again,
this reflects the remarkable feature regarding the timing of the ageing process in
Denmark known as the ‘breathing-space’. Fortunately, there is still time to think
about how to ‘avert the old age crisis’ — to paraphrase World Bank (1994).
The first column, reporting the tax profile under wage indexation, could well
serve as the ‘status quo’ bench-mark. Indeed, as argued in footnote 9, per capita
public transfers and services allocated to the elderly have largely been provided
on a wage indexation basis in the past. The numbers can therefore be seen as an
illustration of the consequences of proceeding on that basis. An increase in the
tax rate of 4 percentage points over the period from 2005 to 2030 would, other
                                                                                                                                   
8 Again, yl does not only include wages. However, having a Cobb–Douglas technology in mind, the wage share
can be taken as constant over time.
9 According to evidence provided by Socialkommissionen (‘Committee on Social Policy’, 1993), the
purchasing power of public pensions increased by more than real wages of blue-collar workers over the period
1970–92. While per capita services allocated to the elderly did not increase by quite as much as real wages over
the same period, they did increase in real terms. As an approximation, we therefore conclude that wage
indexation on average describes a realistic indexation scheme for government expenditures to the elderly over
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TABLE 3











1993 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
2000 10.7 10.0 9.3 10.4
2005 10.7 9.5 8.5 10.3
2010 11.4 9.7 8.2 10.8
2015 12.6 10.1 8.2 11.8
2020 13.3 10.1 7.8 12.2
2025 13.9 10.1 7.4 12.6
2030 14.8 10.3 7.1 13.2
Source: Authors’ calculations
things being equal, cause a rather serious fall in the average after-tax income
received by wage-earners.
As shown by the numbers reported in the second and third columns,
productivity growth combined with price indexation seems to ‘solve’ this
problem. It is interesting to note that in a scenario with price indexation and a
modest productivity growth assumption of 1 per cent a year, the tax rate is hardly
rising.
10 However, by adopting the same policy in combination with a more
optimistic growth scenario (q = 2 per cent a year), the tax burden on working-age
people will fall steadily throughout the projection period and hence bias the
generational distribution of income in a way hardly acceptable to the elderly.
As pure price indexation might ‘decouple’ the living-standard profiles of the
two age-groups, the ‘compromise scenario’ previously outlined, in which
transfers are indexed to wages whereas services lag behind by one percentage
point a year, may be more realistic. The results reported in the last column of
Table 3 confirm the presumption that this scheme would moderate the increase
in the tax burden. However, since transfers constitute the major part of total per
capita public outlays to the elderly, we see that higher tax rates are unavoidable.
To sum up, if we treat public outlays to the elderly within a separate,
balanced budget setting, and if realistic productivity growth rates and indexation
schemes are assumed, the underlying demographic structure tends to delineate a
j-shaped tax profile: falling over the first 10–15 years (the ‘breathing-space’) and
rising over the subsequent 20–25 years (when the ‘baby boomers’ reach pension
age). This finding is important for the issue taken up in the next section.
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III. FISCAL POLICY IN AN INTERTEMPORAL SETTING
1. Why Be Far-Sighted?
While the assumption of a separate old-age budget employed in the previous
section is an attractive analytical abstraction, in many countries (Denmark
included) outlays to the elderly are an integrated part of the general government
budget. The previous section also assumed a balanced budget for each period.
This may, however, be seen as a too ‘myopic’ way of dealing with the budgetary
consequences of population ageing. For those reasons, we now look at more
general fiscal policies that are based on longer planning horizons.
There are at least three reasons for acting in a more forward-looking fashion.
First, as we have argued above, a PAYG financing scheme is likely to produce a
j- shaped trajectory of the future tax burden. Since the ‘baby-boomer’ effect
tends to dominate the ‘breathing-space’ effect, the average tax burden over the
relevant time horizon is likely to exceed the current one. It follows from Barro’s
(1979) so-called tax-smoothing proposition that from the viewpoint of economic
efficiency, the tax rate should be kept as constant as possible over the years. The
point is that the dead- weight loss imposed by a distortionary tax increases by
more than in proportion to the tax rate. Thus if, for example, population ageing
causes a fall in the tax rate needed to finance the old-age social security budget
from 11.0 per cent in 1993 to 10.7 per cent in 2005, and then an increase again to
14.8 per cent in 2030, it would be less costly to have a financing scheme with tax
rates always at about 12½ per cent year after year rather than a tax system where
rates vary between 10.7 and 14.8 per cent.
Second, a longer planning horizon could also be motivated by concerns over
the sustainability of fiscal policy. Data on debts and deficits seem to indicate that
a number of countries would have to modify their policies in a contractionary
direction in order to avoid excessive debt accumulation. For example, OECD
(1994) has estimated the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the small OECD countries
to be 74.0 per cent in 1994, a figure expected to increase to 77.5 per cent already
in 1996. With or without formal debt requirements, such as those implied by the
Maastricht Treaty, many countries fear that it will become increasingly difficult
to service these high debts. Not only high real interest rates, low economic
growth rates and large structural deficits, but certainly also the pressures
stemming from population ageing tend to aggravate these problems.
While the tax-smoothing proposition leads to a recommendation of tax rates
being not only as constant but also as low as possible, sustainability
considerations seem to rule out a cut in tax rates. Needless to say, higher tax
rates could be avoided if instead expenditures could be cut. In any case, since a
sustainable fiscal policy over a given period has been operationalised as one
which implies that the ultimate debt-to-GDP ratio at most attains its initial level
(cf. Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor, 1990), the demographicPopulation Ageing
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pressure on public expenditures requires a fiscal contraction of some kind. Most
likely, a fiscal contraction would make fiscal policy more credible: it would
signal that the authorities are well prepared to meet the future pressure on the
social security budget. A gain in credibility could be reflected in, for example,
lower interest rates. However, since a fiscal tightening could compromise
attempts to fight current high levels of unemployment, governments might well
be reluctant to implement one. Indeed, the balance between short-term
stabilisation and long-term sustainability is very subtle.
The third argument in favour of a far-sighted strategy is somewhat related to
the sustainability argument. It has to do with the distribution of the tax burden
across different generations. If fiscal adjustments are postponed, future taxpayers
would not only have to cover the costs of providing for the elderly, they would
also have to service the public debt which meanwhile might have grown large.
For that reason, it seems advisable to start bringing down public debt now. This
would clearly impose extra costs on currently living generations, either in the
form of higher taxes or in the form of a fall in public services provided for them.
We shall return to the efficiency and intergenerational distribution arguments
for far-sighted fiscal policy in Section IV.
2. The Analytical Framework
Within the confines of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint,
alternative fiscal strategies can be considered.
11 The timing and magnitude of a
fiscal contraction are the guts of our argument. We stress the importance of the
government’s planning horizon, debt targets and future expenditure programme.
Also, even if it is beyond the control of a small economy operating in an
integrated world economy, the importance of the growth-adjusted real interest
rate is examined.
When fiscal policy is set in a forward-looking fashion, we assume that
governments smooth the tax burden associated with a given expenditure
programme. For a given time horizon, n, we calculate a permanent tax rate, !1,n,
which has three properties: first, it is constant; second, it is effective from the
beginning of the year after the base year (i.e. !s = !1,n for s = 1,...,n); and third, it
ensures that fiscal policy is sustainable. The last assumption rules out that the
debt- to-GDP ratio at the end of the planning horizon, bn, can be higher than in
the base year (i.e. bn ! b0). The permanent tax rate thus comprises current and
future primary expenditures (including the costs of population ageing), interest
payments associated with existing public debt, and the revenues needed to either
stabilise or bring down public debt. Two alternative debt targets are considered:
a ‘soft’ one, where the ultimate debt-to-GDP ratio is the same as in the base year,
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and a ‘tough’ one, where all outstanding debt has been settled at the end of the
planning horizon.
While !1,n identifies the conduct of fiscal policy in the case of a very resolute
and far-sighted government, the timing of the introduction of sustainable fiscal
policy could be different. As indicated by our demographic investigation, the
projection period (1994–2030) can be divided into one sub-period (1994–2005)
with a declining demographic pressure and another sub-period (2006–30) with
strong population ageing. Even if the government’s time horizon is long, it might
be tempted to enjoy the short-term benefits from the reduced pressure on public
expenditures during the ‘breathing-space’ period. Formally, suppose the
government chooses to postpone the fiscal adjustment by, say, m years (where 1
< m < n). Suppose further that a pay-as-you-go strategy with a balanced budget
(i.e. leading to no change in the ratio of public debt to GDP) is pursued in each
of the m years, whereupon the government switches towards a forward-looking
policy. The permanent tax rate, !m+1,n, thus has to cover the average primary
expenditures after time m, accrued interest payments on the initial debt and the
desired debt reduction. The primary surpluses accumulated up to period m
clearly have to be subtracted. If m is around a dozen years, the expenditure
programmes after period m are likely to be more expensive than those before
period m, and we would expect that !m+1,n > !1,n .!m+1,n - !1,n can therefore be seen
as a measure of the costs of postponing the tax adjustments that are required in
any case.
We now turn to the magnitude of the fiscal adjustment. The difference
between the current tax rate, !0, and a permanent tax rate, say !1,n, may convey
some useful information about the magnitude of the required fiscal adjustment.
In fact, following Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor (1990), it has
become standard practice to interpret !0 - !1,n as an indicator of fiscal
sustainability: if !0 - !1,n > 0, fiscal policy could be relaxed, and if !0 - !1,n < 0,
fiscal policy should be tighter. While that interpretation seems valid if the time
horizon is short (e.g. n = 1), care should be exercised if the time horizon is
longer (as in the present study where n = 37). The point is that if the output gap
is non-zero in the base year (i.e. if GDP does not correspond to ‘normal’ capacity
utilisation), the base-year levels of taxes, !0, cash transfers, h0, and, perhaps to a
lesser degree, government spending, g0, will be inadequate bench-marks. To
illustrate, suppose there is a recession in the base year. Due to the operation of
built-in stabilisers, !0 would be lower and both g0 and h0 would tend to be higher
than in a ‘normal’ year. If the ‘average’ of the 37 years from 1994 to 2030 is a
‘normal’ year, it would not make sense to make calculations on the basis of the
unadjusted budget in the base year. Put differently, if !0 - !1,n is to serve as an
appropriate indicator of fiscal sustainability, the base-year deficit should be
cyclically adjusted.
The year of 1993, the base year in this study, marked the end of a fairly long
slump in Denmark. As estimated by OECD (1994), the output gap was –5 perPopulation Ageing
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cent, indicating that GDP was 5 per cent below what it would be in a ‘normal’
year. We have suggested elsewhere (Jensen and Motzfeldt, 1994) that under
certain realistic assumptions, the output gap is likely to be closed by 1998. As
our cyclically- adjusted 1993 deficit we thus take the one projected for 1998. Let
cyclically- adjusted variables be denoted by a tilde. We have estimated ˜!0 to
equal 53.2 per cent and ˜g0 + ˜h0 to equal 54.6 per cent; hence our estimated
structural budget deficit is 1.4 per cent for 1993. The corresponding debt ratio,
b0, equals 61.2 per cent. All variables are measured in real terms and as a ratio to
GDP. The non-adjusted budget balance and public debt are linked in a stock-
flow consistent manner.
As to the future expenditure programme, we distinguish between
expenditures allocated to the elderly and other expenditures. Regarding the
latter, we assume that they constitute a constant share of GDP. While this may
not be quite realistic, it allows us to keep the influence of changing spending
priorities separate from the influence of changing demographics. In relation to
old-age expenditures, we distinguish between cash transfers and other costs.
Both categories of expenditures are assumed to go up in line with earnings. As
argued above, this assumption is fairly consistent with the actual way these
expenditures have evolved in the past.
Finally, the magnitude of the fiscal adjustment clearly depends on the real
interest rate, or rather, as the economy is growing, on the growth-adjusted real
interest rate. The direct effect of a higher interest rate is a rise in the costs of
servicing the initial public debt. There is also an indirect effect through the
discount factor. Clearly, a higher interest rate means that a smaller weight is
attached to expenditures concentrated at the end of the planning horizon. Since
‘double ageing’ is likely to take place over the last decade of the planning
horizon, its costs will be smaller, the higher is the interest rate. In the
calculations below, we assume a growth-adjusted real interest rate of 3 per cent a
year.
IV. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
1. Baseline Assumptions
Given the baseline assumptions stated above, we now show the tax and debt
profiles under alternative fiscal strategies; see Figure 2. In each case, the tax
rates are depicted in the diagram to the left and the corresponding debt
developments in the diagram to the right. Except for the pay-as-you-go scenario,
two different debt targets are considered: debt stabilisation (bn = b0), with solid
curves, and debt settling (bn = 0), with dashed curves.
As a bench-mark, consider the pay-as-you-go scenario, Figure 2(a). The
overall budget is balanced each year, i.e. the debt-to-GDP ratio is smoothedFiscal Studies
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throughout. The message is clear: the tax rate is likely to rise quite dramatically
in the next century. By 2030, for example, the tax rate is projected to be almost 5
percentage points above its current level. Changing demographics are not the
only reason, however; the structural deficit in the base year and the positive
growth-adjusted real interest rate also contribute to the required tax increase.
Instead of smoothing the debt ratio, a polar alternative would be to smooth
the tax rate from 1994 to 2030, as in Figure 2(b). The difference between the
permanent tax rate and the current (cyclically-adjusted) tax rate in 1993 is 1.6
percentage points. This indicates a need for some tightening in order for fiscal
policy to become long-term sustainable. If the tax rate is raised to its sustainable
level, the public sector will start saving: the debt-to-GDP ratio will be brought
down from 61.2 per cent in 1993 to 39.3 per cent in 2013. Thereafter, as the
‘baby-boomer’ effect sets in, a long period of government debt issuing takes
place until the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is recaptured in 2030. If the debt is to be
eventually settled by 2030, there is a need for an additional tax increase of 1
percentage point.
Debt reduction seems to have become an area of high priority across a broad
political landscape. As we have seen, if the process of settling public debt is
stretched over many years, the extra burden on taxpayers is fairly modest.
However, an ambitious debt target could also mean that the government wishes
to settle the debt in a medium-term perspective. Both the following demographic
wind (1994–2005) and the economic boom currently experienced by many
European countries would facilitate such a strategy.
Figure 2(c) shows the case where the tax burden is smoothed from 1994 to
2005, then followed by a pay-as-you-go strategy. If the government wishes to
settle its outstanding debt over an adjustment period of 12 years, the overall tax
rate must increase by 5 percentage points above the current level. This is hardly
realistic. Suppose the additional tax burden is levied solely on labour income.
With a share of wages in GDP at about 60 per cent, the labour tax rate should
then be raised by about 8 percentage points! A fiscal contraction of that size
would clearly depress the macroeconomy.
We have also portrayed the case where the government does not aim at a
lower debt-to-GDP ratio. If fiscal policy is no more ambitious than that, the
current tax rate is almost sustainable. Since the major part of the expenditures is
concentrated in the beginning of the adjustment period, the debt-to-GDP ratio is
allowed to rise a little bit before returning to its initial level in 2005.
Finally, consider the scenario where the government behaves first in a short-
sighted fashion (during the demographic ‘breathing-space’) and then in a far-
sighted way. Specifically, we assume that the debt-to-GDP ratio is smoothed up
to 2005 and the tax burden is smoothed thereafter. This scenario could be
relevant if a government feels tempted to derive short-term benefits from the
reduced pressure on public expenditures during the ‘breathing-space’. It could be
a worrying policy to pursue, since subsequent adjustments could be rather toughPopulation Ageing
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FIGURE 2
Taxes and Public Debt (Ratio to GDP), 1993-2030
Jensen & Nielsen
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to implement. We therefore try to evaluate the ‘costs’ of postponing the required
adjustment; see Figure 2(d). The permanent tax rate from 2006 onwards is found
to be 2.4 percentage points above the current level and 0.8 percentage points
above the permanent tax rate if it were implemented from the very beginning. A
policy of tax smoothing thus involves a rather significant ‘jump’ in the tax rate at
the time when the policy change is enacted.
In sum, in order to prevent government debt from increasing in the long run,
fiscal policy should be tightened. Even in the medium term with a following
demographic wind, current fiscal policy is hardly sustainable.
2. Robustness
In general, if there is a need for fiscal contraction, the reason is ‘high’ primary
expenditures, ‘large’ interest payments, ‘ambitious’ plans for debt reduction or a
structural deficit in the base year. In this section, we attempt to examine how
sensitive the magnitude of the required fiscal adjustments is to the timing of the
fiscal strategy, the debt target, the growth-adjusted real interest rate and the
indexation of per capita outlays to the elderly. Furthermore, given the emphasis
of the paper, we would also like to isolate that part of the adjustment that is
attributable to changing demographics.
If we want to isolate the effect of changing demographics, the combined
effects of debt service, debt reduction and the structural deficit should be
eliminated, and the path of primary expenditures should be governed entirely by
demographic factors. Let ˜!0
* be the base-year tax rate in the hypothetical case
where public debt and hence interest payments are zero, and where the structural
deficit is zero. Further, let ˜!1,n
* be the permanent tax rate that covers the current
and (discounted sum of) future primary expenditures. ˜!1,n
* - ˜!0
* then provides a
measure of the fiscal adjustments needed in order to cover the costs of changing
demographics.
Consider Table 4. The first row restates the results under baseline
assumptions. Note that the required increase in the tax rate as a result of
changing demographics is less than 1 percentage point. How are these results
affected if the growth-adjusted real interest rate, r
v, is only 1 per cent?
12 On the
one hand, the burden associated with servicing the public debt falls. If the ratio
of debt-to-GDP eventually converges back to its initial level, the lower interest
rate means that the required increase in the tax rate is more than halved. On the
other hand, a lower interest rate raises the discount factor, hence the ‘baby
boomers’ become more costly in present-value terms. Indeed, the isolated effect
of ageing is higher than the combined effect. However, even if the real interest
rate were to fall to such a low level, there is still a need for a fiscal tightening.
                                                                                                                                   
12 Although this is a low value compared with levels in the 1990s, in the longer run one might expect some




˜!1,37 - !0 ˜!1,37
* - ˜!0
*
bn = b0 bn = 0 (ageing effect)
Wage indexation r
v = 3.0 1.6 2.6 0.8
r
v = 1.0 0.7 2.1 1.0
Differentiated indexation r
v = 3.0 1.0 2.0 0.1
r
v = 1.0 0.0 1.4 0.3
To what extent does the adherence to the compromise scenario with
differentiated indexation defined in Section II represent a solution to this
sustainability problem? Clearly, if old-age services are indexed at a lower rate (1
percentage point less) than cash transfers, the ageing effect is reduced. With r
v at
3 per cent a year, there still is a sustainability problem. However, if r
v drops to 1
per cent a year, the problem disappears. But still, unless something similar to the
compromise scenario is implemented, and the growth-corrected interest rate is
extraordinarily low, fiscal tightening is hardly avoidable in the long run.
V. DOES TAX SMOOTHING PAY?
It has so far implicitly been taken for granted that tax smoothing is optimal, but
we have said nothing about the quantitative significance of this proposition. In
this section, we try to evaluate whether tax smoothing really is worthwhile as a
means to reduce average labour market distortions.
An alternative criterion for assessing the desirability of tax smoothing versus
debt smoothing may be based on intergenerational redistribution effects. We
here partly draw on an earlier treatment of the relationship between ageing and
intergenerational welfare; see Jensen and Nielsen (1993a).
1. The Efficiency Argument for Smoothing
Following standard practice, we consider the dead-weight (or efficiency) loss
associated with taxation as the assessment criterion for the distortionary effect
imposed by a labour income tax, !. We shall not go into details here but just
briefly indicate how to proceed.
13
The point of departure for the measurement of dead-weight loss associated
with taxation is a simple image of the labour market with curves representing
elastic labour demand and supply. The computation involves a subtraction of the
total welfare after the introduction of the labour income tax (the sum of
                                                                                                                                   
13 For more information on the calculation, see Jacobsen, Jensen and Nielsen (1994).Fiscal Studies
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consumers’ surplus, producers’ surplus and the government revenue) from the
total welfare in the hypothetical case where the revenue could be collected on a
lump-sum basis. Assuming that capital income taxation is approximately revenue
neutral (not an unrealistic assumption in the Danish case),
14 and taking the
production structure to be Cobb–Douglas, the dead-weight loss may be written
as E = "!





s), where $ is the wage share in production, %
d is the
numerical elasticity of labour demand and %
s is the numerical elasticity of
compensated labour supply.
Given this expression for the dead-weight loss, we are now equipped to
examine the quantitative importance of following either of the above scenarios
for tax rates and public debt in the period 1993–2030. First, we use the following
values for the key parameters: $ = 0.538, %
d = 2.16 and %
s = 0.103. (The last
estimate relies on Smith (1990), while the former two draw on Danish National
Accounts.) These parameter values result in a value for " of 0.183.
Using this value of " in the formula for the dead-weight loss, we discover that
the differences in the dead-weight losses associated with the three strategies —
(a) balanced budget in the entire period, (b) far-sighted tax policy and (c)
balanced budgets until 2010 and far-sighted tax policy thereafter — are very
slight. Indeed, the difference in the present value of the dead-weight losses
between strategies (a) and (b) accounts for only about 0.03 per cent of GDP in
1993.
Using a much higher estimate of the elasticity of compensated labour supply,
probably the most uncertain parameter in the computation, does not really
change the picture. A three-times-as-high elasticity only produces a difference in
dead- weight losses of 0.1 per cent of GDP.
So while for efficiency reasons it is preferable to adjust to the upcoming
period of population ageing by keeping the overall tax rate constant, it does not
make much difference, quantitatively, whether this strategy or one of balanced
budgets is pursued.
2. Concerns over Intergenerational Equity
A more potentially forceful argument for keeping tax rates constant over a period
of major swings in the composition of the population relates to intergenerational
distribution.
We demonstrated above that when the number of old people increases
drastically relative to the number of workers, then the contribution the latter pay
in order to sustain transfers and services to the former that keep pace with
(before-tax) wages will increase markedly. If, until the process of population
                                                                                                                                   
14 Interestingly, the capital income tax in Denmark — aside from the corporate income tax — actually yields a
negative net revenue, because much of private sector capital income benefits from special tax concessions
whereas all interest expenses are fully deductible from taxable income.Population Ageing
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ageing sets in, fiscal policy has implied a constant debt-to-GDP ratio and
balanced budgets, then those generations that become old during the ageing
period will hardly feel the ageing process at all. In contrast to this, the general
tax burden of those who are working when the process runs its course will
experience taxes that rise in line with increased old-age-related expenditures and
will thus be quite substantially affected.
In the opposite scenario with far-sighted fiscal policy from now on, taxes
would be raised to a constant level well before the ageing process really sets in,
so that the economy would end up with the same debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of
the horizon. Compared with the former scenario, those generations that become
old during the process of population ageing are now taking part in society’s
preparation for the period by making it possible to reduce public debt in the
mean time. Furthermore, since when ageing sets in there will be smaller interest
payments (on a smaller public debt), those generations that are of working age
during the ageing period will not have to pay quite such high taxes as in the first
scenario. It is therefore fair to say that this scenario has the property of sharing
the burden of the ageing process in a better way between generations, in
particular between the old and the young when the population ages.
In an earlier paper (Jensen and Nielsen, 1993a), we have investigated the
relation between population ageing, the public pension system and
intergenerational redistribution. Different strategies for the evolution of benefit
and tax rates within a PAYG public pension system in the face of demographic
changes were considered, and the implications of these strategies for
intergenerational redistribution were mapped. It clearly emerged that a strategy
of keeping pension benefit rates unchanged, while having contributions adjust
(upwards) under population ageing gave rise to the most uneven generational
impact, essentially because those generations that become old during the ageing
process are not made to carry any burden. A strategy of keeping the ratio of the
benefit rate to the after-tax wage fixed (so that both benefits and contributions
carry part of the burden of ageing) fared better, as did a strategy of keeping
contribution rather than benefits unchanged. In a similar vein, we would expect
in the present context that a strategy of debt reduction before the ageing process
really sets in will represent a more intergenerationally equitable response than
simply having the entire burden of ageing being borne in the form of taxes paid
by contemporaneous workers.
A more careful investigation of the intergenerational equity argument for
sustainable policy under population ageing, using, for example, the technique in
Jensen and Nielsen (1993a), lies outside the scope of this paper and must be
relegated to future work.Fiscal Studies
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
As a consequence of ageing populations, there is a pressure on public outlays
allocated to the elderly. This paper has discussed two alternative approaches to
overcome the future demographic burden, namely pay-as-you-go financing (to
indicate short-sighted fiscal policy) and funding in advance (to indicate far-
sighted fiscal policy). Both strategies are organised by the public sector and
assumed to be integrated into a sustainable fiscal programme. Although we have
taken Denmark as a case-study, our results easily generalise to other OECD
countries.
Under a pay-as-you-go scheme, we find that the future tax rate is likely to
delineate a j-shaped profile: slightly falling over the first 10–15 years (the
demographic ‘breathing-space’) and rising over the next 20–25 years (when the
‘baby boomers’ reach pension age). The results are, however, rather sensitive to
the assumptions about, notably, productivity growth, the indexation rule
adjusting per capita outlays and the real interest rate.
While pay-as-you-go financing thus tends to imply varying tax rates, tax
smoothing is characterised by varying debt-to-GDP ratios. Against the bench-
mark of the cyclically-adjusted tax-to-GDP ratio in 1993, we have shown that the
permanent tax rate is about 1.6 percentage points higher than the 1993 ratio.
However, changing demographics seem to account for only about a half of that
increase. Hence, if fiscal policy in Denmark is unsustainable at present, this is
also due to excessive spending in the past combined with high current growth-
adjusted real interest rates. Whereas considerations of economic efficiency point
to tax rates being as constant and as low as possible, concerns over the
sustainability of fiscal policy thus seem to rule out a cut in tax rates, at least if
current spending priorities remain unchanged.
Although the case for far-sighted behaviour can be made rather easily, it may
be controversial to translate this wisdom into the daily practice of tax policy. In
particular, the risk of fiscal ‘overkill’ might well rule out such a policy. Also,
since recent research on the ‘politics’ of budgetary policy has identified a short-
term deficit bias of political decision-making, the temptation to cut taxes during
the initial period with lower demographic burdens might be hard to resist.
Overall, the message of the paper is that in spite of all obstacles to a long-
term orientation in the conduct of fiscal policy, there are several good reasons
for such a policy. In the interest of equity between generations, we suggest that
those who become old during the population ageing period should be more
heavily involved in reducing public debt over the next decade or so, thus
lowering the burden that will have to be borne by working-age people during the
ageing period. Furthermore, explicitly making fiscal policy sustainable from now
on is likely to bring credibility-related secondary gains in the form of lower
national interest rates and lower inflation.Population Ageing
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